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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2005, an eleventh grade student with mobility needs
transferred to a new high school in Alaska where the parents sought
door-to-door transportation service as part of the student’s special
education program.1 Initially, the new school district provided the
requested service, but in March 2006 its administrators decided to
discontinue it.2 The parents filed a due process complaint under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),3 claiming that
the district’s decision to eliminate those transportation services
constituted a violation of the student’s right to a free appropriate
public education (FAPE) to which students with disabilities are
entitled.4 The impartial hearing officer (IHO) ruled in favor of the
parents.5 In the IHO’s decision, he acknowledged that in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Schaffer v. Weast,6 Alaska had changed
its state law, effective May 20, 2006, shifting the burden of proof
(BOP)7 from the school district to the party requesting the hearing.8
However, because the parties had presented all of the evidence prior
to the May 20 effective date, and because the school district’s
counsel appeared to have accepted the BOP, the IHO had placed the
BOP on the district.9 On appeal to the federal district court, one of
the district’s arguments for reversal was that the IHO erred in not
placing that burden on the parents, in accordance with Schaffer, since

*Cathy A. Skidmore is a full-time special education hearing officer with the Office for Dispute Resolution in
Pennsylvania. Perry A. Zirkel is a university professor emeritus of education and law at Lehigh University. Both authors
previously served as review officers in Pennsylvania during the seventeen-year period that the state had a two-tier system of
IDEA administrative adjudication.
1 Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. N.S. ex rel. R.P., 2007 WL 8058163 at *2 (D. Alaska Nov. 8, 2007).
2 Id. at *3.
3 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1482 (2012).
4 Anchorage Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 8058163 at *3.
5 Id. at *1.
6 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (ruling that the burden of persuasion in an impartial hearing
under the IDEA is on the party challenging the Individualized Education Program (IEP)).
7 The use of “BOP” here, and throughout this article, is to the burden of persuasion, as contrasted with the burden of
production.
8 Anchorage Sch. Dist, 2007 WL 8058163 at *5.
9 Id.
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they filed for the hearing.10
This case exemplifies the importance of the Schaffer holding in
IHO decisions under the IDEA and, consequently, potential
appealable error in those cases that proceed to court.11 The principal
purpose of the IDEA and its predecessor statutes was to afford full
educational opportunity to children with disabilities12 in the form of
FAPE.13 In providing an array of protections to children with
disabilities and their parents,14 each of the laws contained a
framework for dispute resolution that included administrative due
process hearings.15 Thus, the administrative due process hearing had
been a procedural safeguard for parents and local education agencies
(LEAs) since the 1975 predecessor to the IDEA16—thirty years
before Schaffer. Prior to Schaffer, there was no generally accepted
approach to, or basis for, assigning the BOP to one party or the other
in IDEA cases.17
An impartial hearing is the initial and, in many cases, the final
adjudication for resolving the broad range of disputes under the
10 Id.
11 In the illustrative case from Alaska, if the court concluded that the IHO erred in the placement of the BOP and that the
error was prejudicial, the result could be remand or outright reversal. In other cases, questionable treatment of the BOP might
increase the odds of or grounds for appeal, thus defeating one of the purposes of prompt final dispute resolution.
12 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012) (originally enacted as Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94142 § 3, 89 Stat. 773).
13 Id.
14 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1415 (2012). These protections extend to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,” id. § 1415(b)(6), and
include locating and evaluating children who may have a disability, developing an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for
children who are eligible, and placement in the least restrictive environment that is appropriate for the child’s needs. Id. §
1412(a).
15 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2012). Additional dispute resolution processes include mediation, id. §§ 1415(b)(5), 1415(e) and
the state-complaint resolution process. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151.
16 The original statute was the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), which Congress has reauthorized
and amended on several occasions. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400). The 1997 statute renamed the legislation the IDEA, Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400). The current
version of the statute, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108, 118 Stat. 2647
(codified as amended at 20 U.S. C. § 1400), became effective in 2005. For a comprehensive synopsis of the EHA, see, e.g.,
MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE 1:4-1:7 (2008). For a brief summary of the various
amendments, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Who Has the Burden of Persuasion in Impartial Hearings Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act?, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 1 (2013).
17 See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 49.
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IDEA.18 Based on the ample latitude provided to the states under the
IDEA’s scheme of “cooperative federalism,”19 the state systems for
the administrative hearing process vary widely in many respects,20
but the IDEA provides for judicial appeal of those administrative
decisions directly to courts.21 Despite the requirements for prompt
resolution of these disputes at the administrative level,22 the gradual
direction since the passage of the original version of the IDEA in
1975 has been in the direction of increasing “judicialization,”23
including a single tier composed of full-time administrative law
judges (ALJs).24 This increased judicialization includes the issue of
which party bears the BOP, more specifically the burden of
persuasion as differentiated from the burden of production.25
This article provides a systematic examination of the BOP in
hearing officer decisions both before and after Schaffer. Part II
examines the legal basis for the BOP both before and after the U.S.
Supreme Court decision, resulting in the questions for this study.
Part III explains the method used to collect and analyze the data, and
18 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2012). These adjudications are final in many cases because most states have opted for a single
tier administrative process, with appeals directly to state or federal court. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. Costs and
other considerations likely lead many parties to forego further litigation of an IHO decision. See Perry A. Zirkel, Judicial
Appeals for Hearing/Review Officer Decisions under IDEA: An Empirical Analysis, 78 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 375, 376 (2012)
(describing process of appealing an IDEA administrative decision as “costly and ‘ponderous’” (quoting Burlington Sch. Comm.
v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985)).
19 See, e.g., Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52.
20 The variations include whether the state employs a one or two-tiered process and whether the hearings are conducted
by special education IHOs or Administrative Law Judges who also hear other types of matters. See, e.g. Perry A. Zirkel & Gina
Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2010). For
research on the longitudinal trends in the frequency and outcomes of IHO decisions, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy A.
Skidmore, National Trends in the Frequency and Outcomes of Hearing and Review Officer Decisions Under the IDEA: An
Empirical Analysis, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 525, 527–40, 550–56 (2014) (providing an extensive literature review as
well as updated findings).
21 For judicial appeals, the IDEA provides concurrent jurisdiction for state and federal courts. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)
(2012).
22 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a).
23 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping Judicialization in Special Education
Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007).
24 Zirkel & Scala, supra note 20, at 7.
25 See, e.g., Thomas A. Mayes, Perry A. Zirkel & Dixie Snow Huefner, Allocating the Burden of Proof in Administrative
and Judicial Proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 27, 35–36 (2005) (noting
the relationship and distinctions among but distinctions between burden of proof and standard of review, as well as quantum of
proof).
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Part IV presents the results that answer the specific research
questions. Part V discusses those results and the implications of the
findings for special education dispute resolution and provides
recommendations for further study.
II. FRAMEWORK
Neither the IDEA nor the predecessor versions of the statute
made any provision specifying which party bore the BOP at the due
process hearing.26 It was not until 2005 in Schaffer v. Weast27 that
the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed this issue. Thus, the
framework for this study consists of two successive time periods,
with Schaffer as the dividing line.
During the pre-Schaffer stage, the approaches for answering this
question varied widely based on state laws, court decisions, and—
especially in the absence of such authority—IHO interpretations.28
These approaches included (1) placing the BOP on the district
generally, and (2) placing the BOP on the filing party, i.e., the one
seeking to change the status quo.29 The legal literature was replete
with advocacy urging Congress or the Supreme Court to adopt one
approach or another.30
In Schaffer, the Court started its analysis by clarifying that its
focus was the burden of persuasion and noting that the IDEA omits

26 For a discussion of other procedural matters that the IDEA did not address, see, e.g., Mayes et al., supra note 25, at 30
n.8 (identifying four “unanswered ‘procedural’ questions” in the IDEA: (1) the standard of review at the second-tier
administrative level; (2) the introduction of additional evidence on judicial review; “(3) the availability of money damages as a
remedy for IDEA violations;” and (4) representation of parties by lay advocates). Id.
27 Shaffer, 546 U.S. 49.
28 For a synthesis of the various approaches at the administrative and judicial levels, by Circuit, see, e.g., Mayes et al.,
supra note 25.
29 Id.
30 Anne Johnson, Evening the Playing Field: Tailoring the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at IDEA Due Process
Hearings to Balance Children’s Rights and Schools’ Needs, 46 B. C. L. REV. 591, 613–22 (2005) (suggesting a split approach
wherein the party challenging the program would bear the burden on substantive issues and the school district would bear the
burden on procedural issues); Mayes, et al., supra note 25, at 45–57 (recommending that Congress place the burden on school
districts in most cases); see, e.g., Christopher T. Leahy & Michael A. Mugmon, Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act Due Process Challenges, 29 VT. L. REV 951, 963–72 (2005) (recommending that the Supreme
Court place the burden on school districts due to their information advantage and specialized expertise, Congressional intent in
the IDEA to protect children, and the affirmative obligation the IDEA places on school districts).

288

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

35-2

any reference to which party has this burden.31 Within this
framework, the Court relied on “the ordinary default rule that
plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims,”32 to hold that
“[t]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an
[Individualized Education Program] IEP is properly placed upon the
party seeking relief.”33 In limiting the holding to the FAPE issue of
the underlying case, the Court did not directly address which party
has the BOP for other IDEA issues.34 Moreover, because it was not
an issue in the case,35 the Court expressly declined to address
whether a state may adopt a different approach for the burden of
persuasion in impartial hearings, such as placing it generally on
school districts.36 Finally, the Schaffer Court pointed out that the
BOP issue should rarely be outcome determinative, because “very
few cases will be in evidentiary equipoise.”37
During the post-Schaffer stage, the pertinent legal literature has
been much more limited in quantity and scope.38 For example, Zirkel
canvassed state laws and lower court cases post-Schaffer, and
recommended that Congress provide a clear and comprehensive
resolution as to the burden of persuasion, specifically by placing this

31 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 62. This holding assumes that the party seeking relief and the party challenging an IEP are necessarily the same;
however, a school district may file a due process complaint in which it seeks relief without presenting a challenge to its IEP.
Zirkel, supra note 16, at 5 n.27.
34 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
35 The case arose in Maryland, a state that did not have a statute or regulation governing the BOP in administrative
proceedings under the IDEA. Id. at 61.
36 The Court referenced MINN. STAT. § 125A.091, subdiv. 16 (2004); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-8-9.08(8)(c)(6) (Supp.
2004); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(e)(9) (2003); and DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 14, § 3140 (West 1999). For a more
comprehensive and current canvassing of pertinent state laws, see, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 16, at 6–12.
37 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 58. In his dissent, Justice Breyer similarly described the case of “perfect evidentiary equipoise”
as “rara avis.” Id. at 69 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Burns, Schaffer v. Weast: Why the Complaining Party Should Bear the Burden of Proof in an
Administrative Hearing to Determine the Validity of an IEP under IDEA, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 567 (2006) (defending the
Schaffer decision as harmonious with the policies of the IDEA); Luke Hertenstein, Assigning the Burden of Proof in Due
Process Hearings: Schaffer v. Weast and the Need to Amend the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 74 MO. L. REV.
1043 (2006) (recommending that Congress amend the IDEA to place the burden of proof on parties according to the issue
presented, such as requiring the party opposing an evaluation or proposing a change in the program to bear the burden).
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burden on the district except for specified circumstances.39 Although
legal scholars have, in the abstract, disagreed as to the impact of the
burden of persuasion on IHO decisions,40 the relevant literature lacks
a systematic examination of IHO treatment of the burden of
persuasion pre and post-Schaffer.
The purpose of this article is to compare, on a national basis, a
representative sample of IHO decisions published in the INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION LAW REPORT (IDELR)41 before and
after Schaffer with respect to the treatment of the burden of
persuasion. More specifically, the research questions are as follows:42
1.Did the percentage of the cases where the IHO identified or
applied the BOP change significantly from the pre-Schaffer to the
post-Schaffer period?
2.In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, (a)
what was the specified basis pre and post-Schaffer, and (b) was there
a significant difference in the basis between the two periods?
3.In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, (a)
what was the specified approach pre and post-Schaffer, and (b) was
there a significant difference in the approach between the two
periods?
4.In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, was
there a significant difference between the pre-Schaffer and postSchaffer cases in terms of (a) which party filed for the hearing, and
(b) on which party the IHO assigned the BOP?
5.In what percentage of cases where the IHO identified or applied
the BOP was the BOP explicitly outcome determinative, both pre and
39 Zirkel, supra note 16, at 17. In the meanwhile, he recommended that IHOs rely on the burden of persuasion in their
written decisions only rarely, specifically only when the case is carefully found to be in equipoise. Id. at 18.
40 Compare Zirkel, supra note 16, at 18 (recommending a limitation on making BOP determinations to those few
circumstances where such analysis is necessary), with Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 30, at 957 (characterizing the allocation of
the BOP as critical to the outcome). Cf. Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families under the IDEA: Collaborative in Theory,
Adversarial in Fact, 32 NAT’L ASSN. OF ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 446 (2012) (concluding that the Schaffer decision will
particularly impact indigent families); Terrye Conroy, Mitchell L. Yell, & Antonis Katsiyannis, Schaffer v. Weast: The Supreme
Court on the Burden of Persuasion When Challenging IEPs, 29 J. REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC.,108 (2008) (examining the
implications of Schaffer and suggesting that schools focus on the more important obligation of providing an appropriate
education rather than on who bears the burden of persuasion in the hearing process).
41 The IDELR is a specialized reporter available from LRP Publications, whose database is generally accessible through
a subscription to SPECIAL ED CONNECTION®, http://www.specialedconnection.com (last visited December 30, 2015).
42 In light of the overall comparison purpose of this study, the wording of each research question is in terms of pre and
post-Schaffer.
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post-Schaffer?
6.Did the prevailing party outcome (based on previous article
determination of prevailing party status) change significantly from
the pre-Schaffer to the post-Schaffer period?
III. METHOD
To evaluate the impact of Schaffer, the authors utilized the
random sample of decisions from Zirkel and Skidmore’s 2014
frequency and outcomes analysis,43 supplemented with cases from
2013 obtained via the same selection procedure. Next, given the
retroactive effect of Schaffer, which the Court issued on November
14, 2005, the authors eliminated the only IHO decision in the original
Zirkel-Skidmore sample in 2005 issued after that ruling44 so as to
have a clear partition between the pre- and post-Schaffer
subsamples.45 As a result, the two subsamples consisted of 192 and
65 cases, respectively.
The coding of these cases proceeded in three steps. The first step
was the development and refinement of the coding spreadsheet and
protocol (i.e., coding instructions) via joint pilot testing with a small
sampling of the cases. The second step was each author’s
independent coding of a second sampling of the cases for the related
purposes of finalized, fine-tuning of the protocol and obtaining
acceptable inter-rater reliability.46 The third step was for each author
to code approximately half of both the pre and post-Schaffer
subsamples to complete the spreadsheet.47
After the identifying information for each case,48 the initial
43 Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 20, at 540-42 and n.98 (including an explanation of the representative sample size and
selection procedure). That sample spanned a thirty-five year time period beginning on January 1, 1978 and concluding on
December 31, 2012.
44 The IHO issued this decision two days after Schaffer, and the written opinion does not indicate whether the IHO was
aware of the Schaffer ruling. Baltimore Cnty. Pub. Sch., 46 IDELR ¶ 57 (Md. SEA 2005). There were no other 2005 decisions
following Schaffer in the sample.
45 Because the focus was IHO decisions, the authors also excluded the 112 review officer decisions in the Zirkel and
Skidmore, supra note 20, sample.
46 The requisite standard was a minimum of 90% agreement for each of the coded variables.
47 A copy of the final spreadsheet, along with the protocol or coding instructions, is available from the first author upon
request.
48 The identifying information comprised the first three of the initial columns on the spreadsheet, which consisted of the
IDELR citation, the year of the decision, and the jurisdiction (i.e., the state or, in one case, the District of Columbia).
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columns of the spreadsheet consisted of entries for the filing party
and whether the IHO directly identified or applied the BOP.49 The
entries for the subsequent enumerated spreadsheet columns were
limited to those cases where the IHO identified the BOP, specifically
listing the cited support, if any;50 the BOP approach;51 the party on
whom the IHO placed the BOP;52 and whether the BOP was clearly
outcome determinative.53 The final two columns on the spreadsheet
were for the case outcome54 and clarifying or supplementary
comments.55
The analysis of the spreadsheet entries followed the sequence of
the aforementioned56 research questions. For the purpose of
determining statistical significance, the authors used the chi-square
test with the requisite level being a minimum of .05.57
IV. RESULTS
This section provides the findings for each of the six research
questions in seriatim. The results are based on the total sample of
257 cases, 192 pre-Schaffer and 65 post-Schaffer. With the exception
49 The search terms were “burden” and “ prove” (without the quotation marks but with the space inserted before the
second term). In a separate test during the pilot phase, the authors found that this combination yielded the same relevant results
as a much more extensive set of search terms with significantly fewer false positives to eliminate. During the collection or
coding stage, the authors differentiated into separate columns the “identified” and “applied” variants, but at the analysis stage
the authors conflated them based on their overlap in the data.
50 The support, or basis, categories were: (a) state law or court decision, (b) Schaffer, (c) other federal court decisions,
(d) miscellaneous other (specified in the spreadsheet’s comments column), or (e) unknown/not specified.
51 The pilot phase yielded six categories of approaches, based on sufficient frequencies, of BOP placement: (a) on the
district; (b) on the parent; (c) on the filing party, (d) on the party seeking a more restrictive placement; (e) miscellaneous other
(specified in the Comments column); or (f) unknown.
52 The coding categories for this variable were: (a) the district, (b) parent, (c) both parties, and (d) unknown.
53 This category required review of the IHO’s treatment of the BOP as it related to the IHO’s ultimate conclusion.
54 Imported from the Zirkel & Skidmore study, the case outcomes were based on prevailing party status. For an
explanation of this basis, see Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 20, at 547–50.
55 Where specific to one or more of the previous entries, the letter of the applicable column(s) preceded the comment.
56 See supra text accompanying note 42.
57 A Chi Square is an inferential statistic, providing a criterion for determining whether a difference is of statistical
significance or is a reflection of a mere chance occurrence. In general, if an event would occur by chance only 5% of the time
or less, the probability that it would occur for reasons other than chance is expressed as p < .05. Thus, a designation of p < .001,
as in Tables 1, 2, and 3 infra, means that the probability of an event occurring other than by chance is less than .1%. For a more
detailed explanation of Chi Square, see, e.g., PRISCILLA E. GREENWOOD & MIKHAIL S. NIKULIN, A GUIDE TO CHI-SQUARED
TESTING (1996).
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of Table 1, the results reflect the number of IHO decisions that met
the criteria for each successive question, thereby omitting decisions
that did not reflect the BOP.
A. Did the percentage of the cases where the IHO identified or
applied the BOP change significantly from the pre-Schaffer to
the post-Schaffer period?
Table 1 includes all 257 IHO cases in the sample, identifying
those that did and did not identify or apply the BOP.58 Since the
authors could determine the answer to this question for each case in
the sample, the two rows in Table 1 account for all 257 cases.
Table 1: Chi-Square Analysis of BOP Identification/Application
Before and After Schaffer
BOP
Identified/Applied?

Yes

PreSchaffer
(n=192)

60 (31%)

PostSchaffer
(n=65)

Chi
Square

50
(77%)
χ² =
41.38**

No

132 (69%)

15
(23%)

** p < .001
Review of Table 1 shows that the IHOs identified or applied the
BOP in less than a third of the cases before Schaffer and more than
three quarters of the cases after Schaffer. This was a statistically
significant difference at a high level.

58 See supra note 49.

Fall 2015

Shaffer’s Burden on Hearing Officer Decision Making

293

B. In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, (a)
what was the specified basis pre and post-Schaffer, and (b)
was there a significant difference in the basis between the two
periods?
Table 2 comprises only those IHO decisions where the IHO
identified or applied the BOP.59 Thus, Table 2 is based on 110 of the
total 257 cases.60 Moreover, the three rows in Table 2 represent
conflated categories because of the small numbers in the sample.61
The Miscellaneous Other row consists of cases that did not rely on
state or federal law, such as where the basis was not specified,62 and
where the basis was a specific section of the IDEA.63

59 The first row in Table 1 provided the number of cases included in Table 2; the authors omitted the second row in
Table 1.
60 Thus, the total for this table corresponds to the “Yes” row of Table 1.
61 See supra note 50.
62 See, e.g., Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ./Ceres Unified Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 409 (Cal. SEA 1997).
63 See, e.g., Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. #161, 41 IDELR ¶ 172 (2007) (placing the BOP on the school district to establish that
a child’s behavior was not a manifestation of the child’s disability, citing previous versions of the IDEA and federal
regulations).
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Table 2: Chi-Square Analysis of BOP Basis Before and After
Schaffer

Basis for BOP
(Where Specified)

PreSchaffer
(n=60)

State Law or Court
Decision

11
(18%)

Federal Court
Decision

26
(43%)

Miscellaneous Other

23
(38%)

PostSchaffer
(n=50)

Chi
Square

4 (8%)

43
(86%)

χ² =
22.37**

3 (6%)

** p < .001
Examination of Table 2 reveals that federal case law shifted from
a plurality position (i.e., 43% of the cases that specified the BOP
basis) before Schaffer to the predominant position (i.e., 86%) after
Schaffer. This shift was statistically significant at a level clearly
exceeding the designated64 confidence level. For the federal basis
pre-Schaffer, the leading cited case was the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Tatro v. Texas.65 By contrast, Schaffer accounted for 42 of the 43
cited federal court basis cases after 2005.66
64 See supra text accompanying note 57.
65 Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Irving Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984). Specifically, fourteen of the pre-Schaffer decisions, more than half of those that
identified the BOP based on a federal court decision, cited the Fifth Circuit Tatro decision. The next most frequently cited
federal case for the BOP, accounting for only three cases in the sample, was Oberti v. Board of Education, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d
Cir. 1993).
66 For the single case not citing Schaffer, see Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch. Sys., 49 IDELR ¶ 144 (Tenn. SEA 2007) (citing
McLaughlin v. Holt Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 320 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2003), (ruling without elaboration, that the parents bore
the BOP). Conversely, in the various cases citing Schaffer, one IHO placed the BOP on the parents who filed for the hearing but
with an exception for the independent educational evaluation (IEE) claim based on the IDEA regulation for IEEs. Chicago. City
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C. In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP, (a)
what was the specified approach pre and post-Schaffer, and
(b) was there a significant difference in the approach between
the two periods?
Table 3 provides a compilation of the IHO’s party allocation of
the BOP in the cases where, as in Table 2, the IHO identified or
applied that standard. The first row represents the approach of
putting the BOP on the district in general, whereas the second row
corresponds to the Schaffer approach of putting the BOP on the filing
party.67 The Miscellaneous/Other category conflated other variations,
such as placing the BOP on both parties68 or on the party seeking a
change of placement,69 and also where the IHO did not identify the
basis for the approach.70

Sch. Dist., 57 IDELR ¶ 29 (Ill. SEA 2011) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Murphysboro, 41 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir 1994) to support this IEE
exception).

67 Conversely, as also reflected in legal commentary, none of the IHO decisions adopted a position that placed the BOP
on the parent generally.
68 See, e.g., Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 35 IDELR ¶ 295 (Colo. SEA 2001) (placing the BOP, pre-Schaffer, on the
school district to establish that the placement proposed is appropriate, while the parents bore the BOP with respect to the
appropriateness of the IEP). All of the cases in this subcategory predated Schaffer.
69 See, e.g., Child with Disability, 401 IDELR 239 (Tenn. SEA 1988) (placing the BOP on the party seeking a change in
placement). Again, all of the cases in this subcategory predated Schaffer.
70 See, e.g., Bentonville Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 276 (Ark. SEA 2009) (assigning the BOP to the parents, who were the
filing party, but without citing authority or explaining the reasons for doing so).
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Table 3: Chi-Square Analysis of BOP Approach Pre and PostSchaffer

Approach
(Where Specified)

PreSchaffer
(n=60)

District Generally

13
(22%)

Filing Party

18
(30%)

Miscellaneous/Other

29
(48%)
** p < .001 with Yates correction71

PostSchaffer
(n=50)

Chi
Square

3 (6%)

44
(88%)

χ² =
37.93**

3 (6%)

In Table 3, again based only on the decisions where the IHO
identified or applied the BOP, there was a significant difference in
the approach between the two time periods. Most prominently, the
IHO placed the BOP on the filing party in nearly 90% of cases after
Schaffer72 compared to only 30% of cases prior to that decision.

71 The purpose of the Yates correction is to avoid an overestimate of statistical significance with a small result,
specifically when one cell has a count of less than five such as in the first and last post-Schaffer rows in Table 3. See, e.g.,
Michael Haber, A Comparison of Some Continuity Corrections for the Chi-Squared Test on 2 × 2 Tables, 75 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
510 (1980).
72 In one notable post-Schaffer exception, the IHO placed the BOP on the district to prove that it offered FAPE without
citation to Schaffer. Christina Sch. Dist., 62 IDELR ¶ 97 (Del. SEA 2012).
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D. In the cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP,
was there a significant difference between the preSchaffer and post-Schaffer cases in terms of (a) which
party filed for the hearing, and (b) which party the IHO
assigned the BOP?
Again based on those cases where the IHO identified or applied
the BOP, Table 4 provides a comparison between pre and postSchaffer for (a) the parties who filed for the hearing73 and (b) the
party on whom the IHO assigned the BOP. This Table separately
summarizes the results for each of these sub-questions.
Table 4: Chi-Square Analysis of Filing Party and BOP Party Pre
and Post-Schaffer
PreSchaffer

Parent

51 (88%)

PostSchaffer

Chi
Square

39 (81%)
χ² = .42
ns

Filing
Party
District

7 (12%)

9 (19%)

Parent

30 (57%)

36 (73%)
χ² = 3.17
ns

BOP
Party
District

23 (43%)

13 (27%)

ns = not statistically significant (at the .05 level)
Table 4 shows that for both time periods the parent was the filing
party in more than 80 percent of the cases and the BOP party in a
weaker majority of the cases.74 Moreover, the difference was not
73 For all cases in the sample, the filing party was the Parent in 86% of the pre-Schaffer cases and 81% of the postSchaffer cases. This limited difference was not statistically significant, thus attributable to chance, such as measurement error.

74 The total number of cases in the Filing Party rows of Table 4 does not equal 110 because, for each time period, the
authors omitted the few cases where the filing party was unknown or both parties filed a complaint. Similarly, the authors
excluded the cases where the IHO placed the BOP on both parties from the BOP rows in Table 4.

298

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

35-2

statistically significant for either sub-question 4(a) or sub-question
4(b).
E. In what percentage of cases where the IHO identified or
applied the BOP was the BOP explicitly outcome
determinative, both pre and post-Schaffer?
The BOP was not explicitly outcome determinative in any of the
cases across both time periods. More specifically, the IHO did not
state in any cases that the BOP was a significant reason for the
resulting decision in light of the closeness of the case.
F. Did the prevailing party outcome (based on previous
article determination of prevailing party status) change
significantly from the pre-Schaffer to the post-Schaffer
period?
Table 5 provides the prevailing party outcome75 for all cases in
the sample except for the two that the authors coded as inconclusive,
i.e., as that they only addressed preliminary adjudicative issues with
the ultimate issues preserved for a future proceeding.76 Thus, Table 5
is based on 255 cases.

75 See Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 20, at 547-50, 555-56 (for the specific definition and determination of
“prevailing.”). “Prevailing” in this context refers to the outcome of the case, rather than its separate rulings where the case has
multiple issues. The basis, by analogy, is the case law concerning attorney’s fees under the IDEA.
76 The omitted two cases were Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR ¶ 198 (Cal. SEA 1999) (denying the school
district’s motion for a continuance, admission of an attorney pro hac vice, and consolidations, and partially granting request for
a subpoena for production of evidence) and Secaucus Bd. of Educ., 41 IDELR ¶ 81 (N.J. SEA 2004) (granting a parent’s motion
to dismiss the complaint without prejudice and dismissing the school district’s counterclaim).
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Table 5. Chi-Square Analysis of Prevailing Party Pre and PostSchaffer

Prevailing
Party

Parent

PrePostSchaffer
Schaffer
(n=190)
(n=65)

87
(46%)

Chi
Square

25
(38%)
χ²
1.06 ns

District

103
(54%)

=

40
(62%)

ns = not statistically significant (at the .05 level)
Table 5 reveals that the outcome of the decisions based on
prevailing party status did not change significantly from before
Schaffer or after Schaffer. School districts were the prevailing party
in a moderate majority of the 255 conclusive cases for both time
periods. The difference was due to measurement and other extrinsic,
chance factors rather than the Schaffer ruling.
V. DISCUSSION
This section summarizes and discusses the findings for each of
the questions presented.
Additionally, the authors provide
recommendations for future research and end by returning to the case
in the introduction of the Article.
In response to the first question, the authors found that the
percentage of cases where the IHO identified or applied the BOP
increased dramatically from 31% before Schaffer to 77% after
Schaffer. This finding is statistically significant but not surprising
since the Schaffer decision was the first time the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue of which party had the BOP in special education
administrative hearings.77 Thus, increased awareness and

77 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
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incorporation of this issue may be reasonably expected in IHO
decisions. However, Schaffer may not be the only reason for this
change; the continuing trend toward judicialization of the IHO
process, as illustrated by the gradual shift among the states toward a
single tier of full-time ALJs, is another likely contributing factor.78
It is also noteworthy that in nearly one-fourth of the decisions
after Schaffer, the IHO did not identify or apply the BOP.79 It is
more likely that the IHO opted not to mention a non-determinative
and potentially distracting factor in the case80 rather than that the
IHO was not aware of the new, relatively uniform Schaffer rule,81
although this matter awaits further research. Such empirical
exploration may include follow-up analysis using a larger sample and
more nuanced search terms82 as well as surveys and in-depth
interviews with IHOs.83
In response to the second question that compared the basis for the
BOP where an IHO identified or applied it pre and post-Schaffer, the
similarly significant shift from 43% to 86% in favor of reliance on
federal case law additionally and more specifically aligns with
Schaffer’s impact. The shift away from the Miscellaneous category
fits with this new, major precedent, but the similar yet lesser
reduction for the State category may only be temporary. A variation
to Schaffer, which the Court declined to address,84 is retention or
adoption of a different approach via state legislation or regulations.
All four of the cases in the post-Schaffer subsample relying on state
law, two from Connecticut,85 one from Alaska,86 and another from
78 See Zirkel & Scala, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
79 See supra Table 1 (23%).
80 See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 16, at 18 (suggesting that IHOs reserve identifying and applying BOP for the relatively
rare cases where the evidence is, using Schaffer’s terminology, in “equipoise.”).
81 The qualifier of “relatively uniform,” as explained infra, refers to varying interpretations as to whether Schaffer is
limited to IEP/FAPE cases or applies generically to the whole range of IDEA issues.
82 The conflation here of “identify or apply” merits careful differentiation upon a more robust sample and more nuanced
coding.
83 Such more direct approaches extend from quantitative to qualitative research approaches.
84 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
85 Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 143 (Conn. SEA 2013); In re Student with a Disability, 53 IDELR ¶ 67 (Conn.
SEA 2009) (relying on CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14 (2013), placing the burden of proof in a due process hearing on the
public agency). This regulation pre-dated Schaffer.
86 Anchorage School District, 54 IDELR ¶ 67 (Alaska SEA 2010) (relying on ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4 §
52.550(i)(11) (2013), placing the burden of proof on the party requesting the hearing). This regulation was post-Schaffer.
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Tennessee,87 had state statutes or regulations that specified a
procedure that either varied from or conformed to the Schaffer rule.
In response to the third question, the shift was similarly
significant from the District-Generally and Miscellaneous categories
to the Filing Party approach. This shift may be attributable to
Schaffer, not only within its specific IEP/FAPE scope88 but also
extending usually without any specific analysis to a wide variety of
other issues.89
Issues in this 88% category included the
appropriateness of a district evaluation,90 an eligibility
determination,91 a manifestation determination,92 and a removal to an
interim alternate educational setting.93 In contrast, prior to Schaffer,
the filing party, or default rule, approach only accounted for 30% of
the cases, with the other alternatives being widely varying.94 As a
reflection of some variability in application of Schaffer in states
without their own provisions, the IHO placed the BOP on the District
in two parent-initiated cases in the post-Schaffer sample where the
issue related to an IEE95 and to provision of FAPE.96 In the majority
of sample cases where the IHO did not place the BOP on the filing
party post-Schaffer, he or she did not specify the approach.
However, our research focused on overall quantitative trends, not indepth legal analysis. Further research is recommended to examine
the nuanced analysis and application of the BOP.
In response to the fourth question, for the cases where the IHO
identified or applied the BOP, the pre-Schaffer subsample did not
differ significantly from the post-Schaffer subsample in terms of

87 Metro Nashville Pub. Sch.. 51 IDELR ¶ 116 (Tenn. SEA 2008) (relying on TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1360-04-01-.02
(2013), providing that the moving party usually bears the burden of proof in an administrative hearing). This regulation predated Schaffer.
88 See supra text accompanying note 33.
89 See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 16, at 7, 12-13 (discussing whether, in states without their own BOP provisions, Schaffer
extends to IDEA issues generally, and finding that the answer appears to be yes).
90 See, e.g., Lancaster Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 118 (Cal. SEA 2006).
91 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Springfield, 49 IDELR ¶ 177 (Mo. SEA 2007).
92 See, e.g., Twp. High Sch. Dist. 54 IDELR ¶ 107 (Ill. SEA 2010).
93 See, e.g., California Montessori Project, 56 IDELR ¶ 308 (Cal. SEA 2011).
94 See supra Table 2.
95 Chicago Sch. Dist. 299, 57 IDELR ¶ 29 (Ill. SEA 2011) (relying on Bd. of Educ. of Murphysboro v. ISBE, 41 F.3d
1162 (7th Cir. 1994)).
96 Christina Sch. Dist., 62 IDELR ¶ 97 (Del. SEA 2013) (placing BOP on school district without citation or elaboration).
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which party filed for the hearing and to which party the IHO assigned
the BOP. The parents were in the majority position for filing and for
the BOP across both periods. The finding for the filing sub-question
suggests that, contrary to some scholarly predictions,97 placing the
BOP on parents does not seem to have resulted in a decline in parentrequested due process hearings, at least proportionately.98 The same
appears to be true for school districts. The finding for the BOP subquestion also seems to temper the significance of Schaffer in that the
parties were essentially in the same obligated position before and
after the decision. Again, however, research that extends to more
nuanced and direct sources of Schaffer’s impact is warranted for
more definitive and detailed answers.
In response to the fifth question, in both time periods, there were
no cases where the BOP was clearly and explicitly outcome
determinative. One interpretation of this finding is that IHOs during
both periods have shared the Schaffer Court’s observation that BOP
is a “rara avis” reserved for the unusual cases that are in
“equipoise.”99 Another interpretation, however, is that IHOs are
identifying or applying BOP so much more often after Schaffer100
that it is having some unknown effect on the outcome of the case,
whether intentionally or subconsciously, by setting forth this posture
for the decision-making. Although the authors drew the line at
language that expressly determined the case to be in the equipoise
category, perhaps merely reciting the BOP—particularly in words
suggesting not just identification but application—reflected an
influential effect on the outcome.101 Given the limitations of this
exploratory study, this area is another useful direction for follow-up
research.
Further suggesting the limited effect of BOP as a result of

97 See, e.g., Leahy & Mugnon, supra note 30, at 965-66 (predicting that parents of children would be discouraged from
filing a due process complaint if assigned the BOP).
98 See supra Table 4 and note 73. Our analysis, however, was limited to adjudicated cases, not extending to the
frequency of filings. For the difference between filings and adjudications at the hearing officer level, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel,
Longitudinal Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014) (finding that the ratio of filings to
adjudications approximately doubled for the post-Schaffer period of 2006–2007 to 2011–2012).
99 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
100 See supra Table 1 (77%).
101 In some decisions in the sample, the IHO discussed the BOP while noting its application only when the evidence is in
equipoise. See, e.g., Harrisburg City Sch. Dist., 55 IDELR ¶ 149 (Pa. SEA 2010).
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Schaffer, the finding—in response to the final question—was that the
prevailing party outcomes moderately favored school districts both
before and after Schaffer, with a not statistically significant, i.e.,
generalizable, difference between the two periods. Thus, the impact
of Schaffer appears to be negligible, with the overall outcome
distribution remaining stable upon moving from various approaches
to the Schafer filing-party approach for BOP, without significantly
changing the proportion of cases in which parents or districts were
the filing party. A more nuanced and in-depth analysis of IHOs
decisions, particularly using a more differentiated outcome scale for
issue rulings as the unit of analysis,102 a corresponding analysis of
BOP identification and application on an issue-by-issue basis, and a
systematic examination of other related variables may reveal a more
subtle and meaningful effect.
In any event, the qualified overall conclusion of this empirical
analysis is that Schaffer has not been particularly onerous on IHO
decision-making in terms of its overt effect. In the Alaska case
introduced at the beginning of this article,103 the federal district court
resolved the school district’s BOP challenge by concluding that (1)
Schaffer “[did] not necessarily invalidate state rules,”104 which
arguably applied in the case and which had put the burden on the
school district, and, (2) even if in error, the IHO’s placement of the
BOP on the district was harmless because—with due deference to the
IHOs fact finding—the evidence for the parents was more persuasive
than that for the district.105 This Alaska case is an illustration of a
relatively inconsequential impact of the BOP at the IHO level on the
outcome of a case, even upon appeal.106 The question presented in
the title of this article merits further research and exploration. Our
102 See, e.g., Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 20, at 545.
103 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
104 Anchorage Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 8058163, at * 6.
105 Id.
106 For another example of such a disposition, see Bd. of Educ. of Skokie-Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Risen,
61 IDELR ¶ 130 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (concluding, in relevant part, that the IHO’s misapplication of the BOP was harmless error in
terms of the case outcome). Examining IDEA court decisions regarding the BOP issue would be an additional instructive
avenue for follow-up research. In some cases, BOP as it applies to the IHO level arises significantly at the court level for the
first time, i.e., even when the IHO decision was silent with regard to BOP. See, e.g., Morgan M. v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 64
IDELR ¶ 309 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (ruling, in relevant part, that the IHO committed reversible error for awarding compensatory
education without finding preponderant evidence, expressed in terms of the parent meeting the BOP, for the prerequisite denial
of FAPE).
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results, however, suggest that Schaffer has not imposed a noticeably
arduous burden on IHOs deciding IDEA issues.

